TRENTON — A state grand jury has voted not to file any criminal charges at the conclusion of its deliberations regarding the death of Andrew Washington, 52, of Jersey City, New Jersey, who was fatally shot by Jersey City Police Officer Stephen Gigante on August 27, 2023.

Mr. Washington’s death was investigated by the Office of Public Integrity and Accountability (OPIA) and presented to New Jersey residents serving on the grand jury in accordance with the Independent Prosecutor Directive of 2019. In July 2021, OPIA issued standard operating procedures (SOPs) to ensure these grand jury presentations are conducted in a neutral, objective manner.

The investigation included a 911 call, body-worn camera footage, witness interviews, photographs, ballistics reports, and autopsy results from the medical examiner. This evidence, including video of the incident, was presented to a state grand jury. After hearing the testimony and evidence, the grand jury concluded its deliberations on April 28, 2025 and voted “no bill,” concluding no criminal charges should be filed against Officer Gigante.

According to the investigation, on Sunday, August 27, 2023, at approximately 2:36 p.m., the Jersey City Police Department arrived at an apartment building on Randolph Avenue in Jersey City in response to a 911 call from Jersey City Medical Center, reporting an emotionally disturbed person at the home. When uniformed officers arrived, they spoke with Mr. Washington’s family members outside the residence.  Family members explained that a neighbor had called them earlier in the day and reported hearing loud noises and banging coming from Mr. Washington’s apartment. Family members also advised of Mr. Washington’s mental health struggles, that they believed he was off of his medications, and that he needed to go to the hospital. Family members conveyed that they had contacted a mental-health crisis hotline earlier to request emergency medical services (EMS) for Mr. Washington.

At approximately 2:42 p.m., uniformed officers and EMTs entered the apartment building and attempted to speak to Mr. Washington through the locked door of his second-floor apartment.  Mr. Washington said he did not wish to speak to EMTs, yelled, and alluded to seeing “ghosts.” At approximately 2:50 p.m., Mr. Washington began to strike his apartment door repeatedly with an unknown object.

Uniformed officers and EMTs then moved away from the immediate area of his apartment door and contacted a Sergeant, who responded to the scene.  After being briefed, the Sergeant notified his supervisor and also requested that Jersey City Police Emergency Services Unit (“ESU”) respond to the scene.  ESU officers began to arrive at 2:57 p.m. and spoke to family members outside the residence. ESU Officer Felix DeJesus, who was involved with Mr. Washington approximately two-weeks prior when he assisted Mr. Washington in going to the hospital after a mental-health incident, asked family members about his status.  Family members advised that they did not know because Mr. Washington was not willing to speak to them.

ESU officers then entered the apartment building and took over the scene from uniformed officers.  Beginning at approximately 2:59 p.m., ESU Officer Steven Gigante, a trained negotiator, spoke to Mr. Washington for approximately half an hour in an attempt to persuade him to come out of the apartment and get help.  Officer Gigante explained to Mr. Washington that he was not in any trouble or under arrest and that officers were there to help him and check on his well-being. During the interaction with Officer Gigante, Mr. Washington referred to seeing ghosts and a “suicide mission.”  At a certain point, he stopped responding altogether to the officer.

At approximately 3:14 p.m., ESU was given approval to forcibly enter the apartment.  As captured on body-worn camera footage, and later elaborated upon in officer interviews,  the decision to enter the apartment was made because they had not heard from Mr. Washington for a period of time and were concerned for his well-being. ESU officers planned to “breach and hold,” meaning that they intended to forcibly breach the apartment door and then pause and assess the situation before making entry.

Prior to breaching the door, Officer Gigante was positioned with a tactical shield at the top of the staircase directly in front of the apartment door with his service weapon drawn. Officer DeJesus was positioned on a landing outside the apartment door with his CED (Taser) drawn. The remaining ESU officers were positioned behind Officer Gigante on the staircase. At 3:28 p.m., Officer Gigante forcibly breached the apartment door.

Mr. Washington was standing in the apartment a few feet away from the doorway. Officer Gigante yelled, “He’s got a knife, drop the knife, drop the knife.” Mr. Washington advanced toward the officers with a large knife in his right hand as the door was closing. Mr. Washington opened the door, holding the knife, and continued to advance towards the officers. At that time, Officer DeJesus deployed his Taser, striking Mr. Washington. Officer Gigante simultaneously fired his service weapon twice, striking Mr. Washington, who fell onto the landing at the top of the stairwell. Officers recovered the approximately thirteen-inch knife next to Mr. Washington.

Emergency medical personnel, who had remained outside the residence, rendered first aid at the scene. Mr. Washington was then transported to Jersey City Medical Center, where he was pronounced deceased at 4:47 p.m.

Audio recordings of a phone call to police and police radio transmissions, as well as video footage from police body-worn cameras, related to the shooting were previously released. Those recordings are posted online: https://njoag.app.box.com/s/3cm6ub6hyjnz198upuij4m2orp8g64k8

A 2019 law, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-107(a)(2), requires the Attorney General’s Office to conduct investigations of a person’s death that occurs during an encounter with a law enforcement officer acting in the officer’s official capacity or while the decedent is in custody. It requires that all such investigations be presented to a grand jury to determine if the evidence supports the return of an indictment against the officer or officers involved. The grand jury is instructed on the elements of the potential criminal offenses, including criminal homicide offenses, that could be brought and, as required by statutes, the grand jury is instructed on self-defense and other forms of legal justification.

A conflicts check was conducted pursuant to the Independent Prosecutor Directive and no actual or potential conflict of interest was found involving any individual assigned to the investigation. Prior to presentation to the grand jury, the investigation was reviewed by OPIA Executive Director Drew Skinner in accordance with the policies and procedures established for these presentations in the SOPs.

At the conclusion of these investigations, pursuant to the Independent Prosecutor Directive and applicable SOPs, OPIA determines whether any officer should be referred to the appropriate law enforcement agency for administrative review in accordance with the AG’s Internal Affairs Policy & Procedures. OPIA monitors any resulting review and takes such actions as are necessary to ensure that the review is completed in a timely fashion, and that appropriate actions are taken based on the results of the review.

The Seabrooks-Washington Community-Led Crisis Response Act and Other Reforms 

In January 2024, Governor Phil Murphy signed a bill into law named for Mr. Washington and for Najee Seabrooks, 31, of Paterson, who was also killed during an encounter with law enforcement. The law established the Community Crisis Response Pilot Program and appropriated $12 million to support eligible grant recipients in six counties.

That funding is being overseen by the Office of Alternative and Community Responses (OACR), formally established in March 2024 by Attorney General Matthew J. Platkin. Recognizing that traditional law enforcement responses and tools — arrest, prosecution, and incarceration — alone have proven insufficient in addressing the complexities of substance use disorder and mental health emergencies, OACR was created to help ensure that public health-centered resources and programs are available to law enforcement and their partners in public safety. Following a competitive grant process, organizations in the cities of Camden, Newark, Paterson, Trenton, and Jersey City were selected to receive grant funds of approximately $2 million each to support the creation of local Community Crisis Response Team (CCRT) Pilot Programs envisioned in the Seabrooks-Washington legislation.

The CCRTs, which include the Jersey City-based Anti-Violence Coalition of Hudson County, are intended to provide on-site community-based intervention such as outreach, de-escalation, stabilization, and resource connection for individuals who are experiencing a behavioral health crisis. These pilots add to and complement the response options currently available through the Department of Law and Public Safety, the Department of Health, and the Department of Human Services, including ARRIVE Together, the Community-Based Violence Intervention and Hospital-Based Violence Intervention Programs, which contribute to the establishment of a statewide network for violence prevention, and the Mobile Crisis Outreach Response Team program (MCORTS), which sends a team of mental health professionals and peers to calls originating via the 988 system.

Revision of the Use of Force Policy as It Relates to Barricaded Individuals 

In August 2024, in an attempt to improve the outcomes to encounters between police and barricaded individuals, particularly those who may be experiencing behavioral, mental health or substance use related crises, Attorney General Platkin announced changes to the statewide Use of Force policy. These changes are applicable to every law enforcement officer in New Jersey.

Drafted in consultation with law enforcement, mental health professionals, community stakeholders, and faith leaders, the policy updates were intended to ensure that responding tactical and crisis-negotiation teams are optimally trained and have essential resources.

The changes implemented included the following:

• Law enforcement officers, when dealing with a barricaded individual, are required to contact designated tactical teams, which include trained crisis negotiators, to respond to the scene, ensuring that these incidents are handled by highly trained and equipped units.
• Tactical and crisis negotiation teams are now required to identify qualified mental health professionals who will be available to respond to incidents involving a barricaded individual or hostage situation. The mental health providers can assist with negotiations by offering guidance and information to law enforcement or by communicating directly with the barricaded individual.
• First-responding officers facing a barricaded individual situation are advised to wait for appropriate resources to respond and not attempt to force a resolution, unless that would be immediately necessary to prevent injury or death. When feasible, and when no immediate threat is present, officers should establish a perimeter and communicate with the barricaded individual to assess their status.
• In certain situations, law enforcement may now consider tactical disengagement as a possible method of reaching a resolution, particularly when continued contact may result in an unreasonable risk. Tactical disengagement involves a decision to leave, delay contact, delay custody, or planning to make contact at a different time and under different circumstances when no other public safety threat exists.
• Law enforcement agencies must adopt policies mandating an immediate response by an on-duty supervisor to barricaded situations. That supervisor will establish incident command in order to begin determining what resources are needed and to start the process of summoning those resources.
• Tactical teams must now be equipped with less lethal weapons, such as CEDs and impact munitions, which are often effective in resolving incidents without the need to resort to deadly force.

Jersey City Begins Participating in the ARRIVE Together Alternative Response Program

In October 2024, Jersey City became Hudson County’s second municipality – in addition to Bayonne, through the Hudson County Sheriff’s Office – to participate in the Alternative Responses to Reduce Instances of Violence and Escalation (ARRIVE) Together program. The Jersey City Division of Police forged a partnership with Jersey City Medical Center (JCMC) to undertake a new approach to responding to individuals experiencing mental health emergencies and to follow-up on calls where law enforcement identifies that a person would benefit from mental or behavioral health support.

Jersey City uses a co-response and follow-up model. Plainclothes police officers and mental health professionals from Jersey City Medical Center respond jointly after the call has been identified as appropriate for a co-response or follow-up. The program operates two to three days a week and is expected to expand as JCMC expands its staffing. The Jersey City Police Department intends to also incorporate its Police Chaplain program to provide additional support to individuals and their families, when appropriate.

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